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Introduction 
The food chain represents production stages that range somewhere from agricultural 
supplies to (retail) food outlets, including agriculture, produce auctions, processing 
firms, wholesalers, distributors and retailers. The common denominator being that 
all work with food in one way or the other. 
A range of issues have recently presented themselves and have put pressure 
on the actors within the food chain. Outside the chain there is increasing public 
concern about issues like food safety, environmentally sound production methods 
or animal welfare; legislation on these issues has also left its mark on the food chain. 
Then there is the pressure of increased competition due to the break down of trade 
barriers within the European Union, the GATT agreement and as a result of 
adjustments to the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Internally, the markets have developed from sellers markets to buyers markets: 
the demand side is now saturated while on the supply side there is an abundance. 
Firms are thus forced to act on consumer demand in order to remain competitive. 
The share of foodstuffs in consumer spending has steadily fallen and has been 
overtaken by items like housing and vacations. The drop in demand within the food 
chain has been accompanied by decreasing returns for all involved and has been 
deflected by a steady concentration of activities and ownership. 
In response to this decline a strategy is needed to enable the food chain 
to 're-invent' itself. In this respect, Porter offers two generic strategies to be 
followed (Porter [1]). One is to aim at low cost and low pricing, the other is to 
create new markets and niches by means of differentiation. An additional 
strategy has also been formulated as focusing on whatever a producer is good 
at. The basic idea behind all this is to provide value for money, and to 
translate consumer demands into product properties. This is a move away from 
marketing one product for the masses and tailoring products for smaller niches 
At present there is a tendency towards cooperation within the food chain, 
or at least parts of it. The idea is to create maximum value for the customer 
through vertical cooperation. The principle of the value chain now comes 
forward as each stage within the chain not only handles the product but in so 
doing adds a certain value to it. This will mean that closer coordination 
between production stages is needed. If the price mechanism on the spot 
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market is not effective in communicating differential product characteristics at 
each stage of the market, this will lead to a replacement by a set of contractual 
relations that serve as a governance structure to manage the food chain. 
(Barkema [2]). 
This paper will take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding 
vertical relations in the food chain, e.g. the development of the value chain. It 
attempts to explain to what extent these circumstances govern the creation of a 
vertical governance structure. 
Theoretical perspective 
Alliances 
Process Getting a cooperation agreement running vertically within the chain is 
not the easiest thing to do, for in a normal market situation buyers and sellers 
are usually competing for the best deal. Therefore the benefits of collaborating 
should at least outweigh the existing or perceived disadvantages to justify a 
vertical alignment (van Duren [3]). 
The process of alliance formation has generated lots of research into the 
key ingredients that facilitate success, and partner analyses to ensure a 
successful partnership. Roughly speaking, it involves a three step process 
(Schmitz, et.al. [4]). Firstly the awareness of a problem leads to a concept of 
an alliance; this is then followed by a search for suitable partners; finally a 
selection of partners needs to be made based on perceived effectiveness and 
potential of the partnership. The process of alliance formation is consolidated 
by the arrangement and implementation of an agreement. Both partners thus 
find that they are better off collaborating and working to their mutual benefit. 
In this way both sides willingly modify their business practices to improve 
overall performance. 
Interdependence Thus there is a sense of dependence among partners that 
may lead towards vertical coordination of activities. Apart from sequential 
processes, partners will also find themselves facing common risks, or depend 
on each other to develop more efficient forms of production. Therefore 
interdependencies between firms can be assumed to have a positive impact on 
the development of vertical coordination in the value chain. The more ones 
own performance relies on that of another, the more one will be inclined to 
enter vertical arrangements to secure this. The form in which this takes place 
may vary from outright integration, provision of resources, or specifying items 
in a contract. 
In the following discussion several variables will be identified that play a 
role in the dependencies between firms which lead towards vertical 
coordination. Later they will be brought together into a reference model. 
Goal congruence 
Dependence is built into the very idea of a value chain. It recognises a 
continuous flow between production stages which together determine the 
qualities of the final product. Customer and supplier share a mutual 
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dependency based on the exchange relations. In fact, the customers' customer 
would actually be the suppliers' customer, were he to recognise the 
dependencies between them and their common interest in the final product 
(Hoppenbrouwer [5]). 
The basis underlying these relations is the flow of resources between 
stages of production, in the form of, for instance, raw materials, budget or 
income. The theory of industrial networks recognises that activities are 
connected through resource- dependent relations. Yet all relations are 
interpreted by those involved, based on the knowledge available and their 
intentions (Hâkansson [6]). 
Defining the relation between goal congruence and interdependence can 
become a rather tricky matter. As shown by Hâkansson, the situation is subject 
to ones individual interpretation and recognition of the underlying 
dependencies. This process could thus be influenced by personal experience, 
the local situation, social influence or even culture. Therefore vertical 
dependencies do exist at all times. In cases of goal congruence they can be 
used as a foundation to build a governance structure upon, as such goal 
congruence can be considered as a basic condition underlying vertical 
coordination. Therefore the more the firms' goals correspond the better the 
chances of a vertical arrangement developing. 
Thus in the value chain approach, congruence of intentions and goals 
clarifies where you are heading for. In a case study of 10 alliances involving 
multinational companies it was found that 8 could be considered to have 
conflicting goals. Yet few were willing to admit to this, as it would herald the 
break-up of the alliance. Therefore in this area some ambiguity needs to be 
overcome (Faulkner [7]). 
A study by Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller could serve as another example, 
this study concentrates on networks of firms (Lorenzoni [8]). In the case of 
Benetton, the central node has a very limited scope of activities, largely boiling 
down to coordination. In this way it is able to convey a strategic vision to its 
partners and rally them behind it. Thus a common view of the partnership 
gives a clear idea of each partners role within it. 
Information 
According to Galbraith uncertainty can be described as the difference between 
the amount of information needed to fulfil a task and the amount that is already 
present (Galbraith [9]). This would mean that the more uncertainty one faces 
while making decisions, the more information is needed. In this view 
information is seen as a steering variable responsible for the quality of the 
decision. Perfect information would then allow perfect decisions. 
However, information is not perfect nor it is ever available as such. It 
would be extremely difficult to acquire an overview even if full information 
were available. In the previous section Hâkansson's theory has already shown 
that available knowledge together with the actor's intentions determine a 
relation. Therefore some form of bounded rationality can be assumed, which is 
also argued by other authors (Simon [10]). The role of information is even 
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more complex when the selection and processing processes are considered. 
Selective perception may steer information-seeking behaviour in troubled 
directions (Romme [11]). Or the political orientations of actors may distort 
information that in itself is relevant and solid. 
Therefore decisions are based on the information available and the way it 
is selected and processed. Though full information could eventually be made 
available, it is unlikely that this will be the case. Consequently, one may 
assume that information is looked for both internally and externally, according 
to the needs of the organization. Vertical dependence will increase the more an 
organization demands information from external sources within the value 
chain. If this process works both ways, one could assume a positive impact on 
the development of vertical coordination of activities. 
Considering the role of information within the processes of the value 
chain, one may expect that more open communication will take place between 
allies. This is illustrated by a study of supply chain management in 14 
American chemical companies (Eckstut [12]). The highest rated companies 
showed multilevel contacts with both suppliers and customers resulting in joint 
initiatives and free and open exchanges of information. This helped to improve 
planning capabilities, re-engineer business processes and improve efficiency 
across the organizations as a whole. 
Market structure 
Where market structure is concerned, the dependence on resources 
concentrates on availability. Thompson asserts that in cases of serial 
interdependence, where one activity depends on the preceding one, some form 
of vertical integration may occur (Thompson [13]). This means that when there 
is certainty over availability of an activity there will be no need to integrate. If 
in another case the activities in a following stage should fan out considerably, 
a firm would concentrate on the most crucial activities. 
More or less in line with this is the influence of opportunism on market 
governance (Williamson [14]). Opportunism may happen in markets that are 
oversupplied, giving room to the customer to change from one supplier to 
another without making high switching costs. Therefore stronger vertical ties 
may prove useful to safeguard a relation that is seen as important. Basically, if 
the spot market is able to provide enough alternative resources, there is no 
reason to depend on for instance one supplier or enter into a vertical relation. 
If one is vulnerable to switching by customers or suppliers, this may be reason 
enough to try to bind them in some kind of way. 
An investigation into the development of German agriculture showed that 
the structure of the food industry directly influences the level of vertical 
coordination towards agriculture (Hof [15]), as larger units of production have 
more need to secure their inflow of raw materials. In the Westphalia region 
comparatively large units for pig breeding as well as large slaughterhouses can 
be found. Compared to the rest of Germany the pork market is more 
concentrated on both the supply and demand side. As both sides have a 
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dependence on a continuous flow of production, this leads to higher rates of 
vertical integration. 
The odd thing about vertical coordination is that it combines 
organizations horizontally embedded in many different market structures. The 
quality alliances in the Dutch pork industry may serve as an illustration. These 
would typically involve cooperation on compound feed mills, pig breeders and 
feeders and slaughterhouses, this could even be extended towards food 
retailers. Huge differences in market structure can be observed, yet a vertical 
structure is in place to govern transactions. 
An explanation could be that the quality initiative cuts the number of 
qualified suppliers on the spot market and limits the sources of alternative 
supplies. Therefore the parties involved are willing to enter into more 
protective vertical relationships in this specific area. 
Asset specificity 
Asset specificity comprises particular assets that are uniquely associated to one 
transaction. If the transaction fails, the low salvage rate of the assets results in 
losses which can be regarded as switching costs. In transaction cost economics, 
dependence results from asset specificity. Behaviour characterized by 
opportunism and bounded rationality presents a risk to a dependent relation. To 
avoid being taken advantage of, contract and governance structures are used as 
safeguards (Nooteboom [16]). 
This point is also made by Thompson who notes that the technology of a 
firm may lead to serial interdependence. When one activity thus depends on 
the preceding one, vertical integration may well occur. By including a 
preceding or following stage, a firm is able to reduce uncertainty through 
elimination of a dependent relationship. 
However, the generic process in business integration processes is not to 
integrate the actors vertically or horizontally, but to control the linkages. 
Therefore considering the core-competence attitude of many companies in the 
agri-food industry, it is predictable that vertical integration will take place in 
some situations; mainly when main suppliers contain strategic assets that make 
their customers vulnerable in terms of high switching costs. 
A study of plant-nurseries and vegetable growing in Northern Germany 
revealed highly dependent relations (Behner [17]). On the one side the 
nurseries have invested in a very specific field of horticulture. Among others, 
growing techniques, knowledge and machinery are transaction specific and are 
of little use outside the sector. On the other side vegetable growers have very 
specific demands for varieties of seedlings, quality, delivery time, and the like. 
This cannot be delivered from stock and if anything should go wrong, the 
entire annual crop could be ruined. 
In spite of overcapacity in the market, that would be expected to trigger 
opportunism, long term relations continue to dominate the picture. Both sides 
face potentially high switching costs and will continue the relation as long as 
there is no urgent need to switch. 
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Summarizing 
In this chapter it has been put forward that a relation characterized by mutual 
dependence may lead to a form of vertical coordination. Goal congruence, 
information transfer, market structure and asset specificity have been identified 
as variables that have an effect on the dependencies between firms. 
Congruence of goals of vertically dependent partners may facilitate a 
vertical partnership, however the information demands of the partners signals 
their mutual dependence. This may drive them towards a more open form of 
communication and provision of information. If the market structure limits the 
availability of vital resources or offers few alternatives, vertical coordination 
may be used to reduce dependency. Finally, if specific investments or costs 
have been made to accommodate a transaction, a good reason to enter into a 
vertical relation may be to protect them from opportunism and the possible low 
salvage value resulting from it. 
One may assume that a similar set of variables will not lead to the same 
outcome in all cases. There might be circumstances that moderate the effect of 
interdependency on the governance structure. This will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Model of vertical interdependence 
Product characteristics 
The architecture of the food chain and the nature of the relations within it may 
to some extent depend on the product that is involved. This means that a high 
degree of dependence may already exist between firms which could increase 
the likelihood of adapting some form of vertical coordination for the chain as a 
whole. 
To illustrate this point one could review the chain of iceberg lettuce in 
the USA (Powers [18]. By far the bulk of production takes place in the state of 
California which is then shipped to the rest of the country. Total distribution 
time varies from one day to a week, depending on the destination. 
Fresh vegetables, including iceberg lettuce, are by nature highly 
perishable. This means that this particular value chain needs a tightly knitted 
organization to be able to move the produce around speedily. For one thing it 
also means that inventories within the chain are low. Through highly frequent 
deliveries, retailers need only to carry small inventories to secure continuous 
supplies to their displays. This means that buffering and other speculative 
functions are not viable in this case. Instead the focus is more on cooperation 
and reliability. 
This case showed that close vertical ties are important to maintain 
speedily deliveries of iceberg lettuce. The Dutch vegetable auctions work in 
the opposite way, where highly perishable vegetables are sold more or less on 
the basis of the spot market. Though growers are closely tied to the auctions, 
both distributors and retailers operate independently and still manage to 
transport the produce across Europe. This could mean that once the spot 
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market provides a reliable supply, one could do without vertical contracting. If 
product features cannot be delivered adequately by the market, vertical 
integrations may follow to solve the problem. In this way one can assume that 
product characteristics interact with the market structure. 
Power 
According to Pfeffer, the basis of power lies in the control over resources or 
the control over the supply of information (Pfeffer [19]). However, the use of 
power in a relationship can be limited as the dependence must be usable which 
means that the relation has a certain relevance to both parties, the dependent 
must be able to change his behaviour, and the risk of a backlash must be 
limited. 
A balance of power in a relationship will increase the motivation of the 
partner to achieve mutual benefits. Neither party is then able to push 
something through against the wishes of the other. Therefore a balanced power 
situation may have a positive impact on vertical coordination. 
The case of Superbakery may serve as an example to illustrate the 
balance of power (Davis [20]). The company is a donut bakery based in 
Pittsburg, USA, that achieved a national coverage in a niche market. It can be 
classified as a virtual corporation, as all activities have been outsourced apart 
from product development and customer contacts. The company is mainly 
left with a coordinating function, where the balance of power can be measured 
from the ability to control its contractors. The value of the business awarded to 
outside bakeries is proportionally large. Thus by controlling resources 
Superbakery is able to exert control over, for instance, product quality and on-
time production. 
As the business is relatively small for most vendors and distributors, 
performance requirements are used to exercise control. Thus the companies' 
information and costing system is used to monitor the contractors' 
performance, and the relationship is strengthened by close cooperation on 
improvements. In this way access to performance information allows the 
company to equal the power balance with its contractors. 
Transaction costs 
The transaction itself may also lead to costs which can be divided into a pre­
contract and post-contract type. The former consists of costs for searching, 
selecting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement, which are mainly costs 
for information and communication. However, the process is subject to 
bounded rationality and a degree of uncertainty resulting in the second type of 
transaction costs. The post-contract costs result from maladaption to changes, 
haggling and settling the argument and bonding to secure commitment 
(Williamson [14]). This means that the advantages associated with vertical 
coordination need to be weighed against the potential costs involved. 
A typical example of this can be found in grocery distribution in the 
USA (Thomas, [21]). Concepts like Efficient Consumer Response and Every-
Day-Low-Pricing have sprung up to reduce the cost of the distribution system. 
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These costs are mainly associated with inventories that result from discounts 
on large purchases. Efficiency can be increased through ECR and EDLP by 
means of narrow cooperation with manufacturers on continual replenishment of 
goods. 
Both to wholesalers and self-supplied chains, losing the trade allowances 
would mean a considerable loss of profits on their buying operations. The self-
supplied chains have been more inclined to adopt this concept, as they were 
able to compensate for the losses elsewhere in their operations. For instance, 
by generating a higher volume of sales through lower prices and more 
advertising. Wholesalers tended to view the concept as a threat to their 
operations. They had little alternative in compensating for their losses but to 
increase the margin for services charged to their customers. Therefore though 
ECR and EDLP could be advantageous to the food chain as a whole, the costs 
of cooperation are not equally distributed and therefore participation levels may 
differ. 
Reference model 
In this chapter, three variables have been added that seem to moderate the 
assumed relation between interdependency of firms and vertical coordination. 
Product characteristics have their influence on the setting of the market 
structures which means that the nature of the product or its demands on the 
value chain may limit the number of alternative sources available. This would 
signal an interdependency relation leading to vertical coordination structures. 














The other two moderators can be seen to work as a catalyst on the 
development of vertical coordination in the food chain. Even if dependencies 
exist between firms, it still means that advantages associated with vertical 
coordination need to be weighed against the potential costs involved. Equally 
important is the balance in power, which is a potential motivator for 
cooperation. These can be put together with the variables presented earlier, 
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and related as shown in figure 1. In the next chapter the relations as described 
by the model will be applied to a practical case. 
ECR in dairy products 
Introduction 
A case will be examined to test the coherence of the relations that have been 
described above. It has been taken from a broad project that aims to test the 
ground and develop a standard for ECR in refrigerated processed foods from 
producer to retailer. 
ECR is an integral concept aiming at improved performance in store 
assortments, replenishment, promotion and product introduction. This involves 
close cooperation from both sides. In this case a leading producer in the Dutch 
dairy industry and a nationally operating self-supplied retail chain will be 
reviewed. The data have been drawn from interviews with executives within 
both organisations. 
Interdependence 
Goal congruence The mission statement of the producer expresses the 
intention to produce high-grade and innovative dairy products thus creating 
maximum added value for all stakeholders involved explicitly including 
retailers and distributors. 
The retailer in turn is aiming at creating maximum value for money for 
its customers by offering the 'best of two worlds'. This combines low prices 
with high service and as a key element includes an excellent performance in 
perishables and refrigerated foods. 
The interest in the project for both parties is to build some form of 
competitive advantage. Therefore they tend to look at improvements that can 
be made to the distribution system, i.e. reducing costs, improving planning and 
preventing stocks running out. The retailer wants to evaluate his present 
performance to prepare for future opportunities. The producer uses the project 
to weigh up alternative options for distribution. Additionally there is some 
enthusiasm to start working on the performance of dairy products on the 
shelves and the effectiveness of promotions and product introductions. 
Characterised by goals, generally both companies appear to be more or 
less on the same wavelength. In terms of cooperation, efficiency in distribution 
would seem a common interest, and is therefore likely to be tackled. The 
producer has spotted a few more opportunities for cooperation that have not 
been signalled by the retailer, and which are therefore unlikely to be tackled. 
Product character The line of products on offer consists of about 90 different 
items most of them desserts and drinks. These products are perishable and can 
be kept for about 3 weeks after production, which means they will spend 
roughly 2 weeks on the shelves. 
This relatively short shelf life means that stocks have to be kept as low 
as possible. The lower the stocks, the wider the assortment on display, which 
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ensures that both parties rely on maintaining a dependable flow of products. 
Therefore the nature of the products would positively influence closer vertical 
relations between the firms. 
Market structure The retailer has a share of 3% of the consumer market, 
compared to a 28% share that is reached by the market leader. However, it is 
a member of a purchasing syndicate that covers about a quarter of the market. 
The producer is market leader for desserts and drinks with about a 25% share. 
The company produces for the top segment of the market and has a low share 
in the production of private labels. 
Competition in the dairy market is stiff. Rivalry comes from coops that 
upgrade their products, private labels and foreign brands that have gained 
access to the distribution channels. As roughly one week of stocking and 
distribution time would be enough to bring in produce from anywhere in 
Europe, the space on the shelves is limited, which will intensify the fight. 
The market structure provides the retailer with enough alternative 
sources of dairy produce to allow the retailer to be choosy. Concentrated 
purchasing clout limits the number of alternative customers for the producer. 
Therefore the producer depends on the top segment to consolidate its position 
with the retailer. 
Information The very idea of ECR is an open exchange of information, and 
by joining the project both have been fully aware of this and agreed to this 
principle. As one executive put it: 'we'll just have to be open and be prepared 
to provide information, you can't run away from it in this project.' This 
would mean that joining in is in line with the information demands of both 
organizations. 
The retailer has already made headway in utilizing information 
technology, almost reaching the level of automatic ordering. Clearly, 
efficiency gains can be made by extending this system to producers. 
Furthermore, the retailer is working independently on a system where 
preferred suppliers closely cooperate with the retailer to increase the 
performance of the product category in the store. This provides a tap on the 
knowledge of the specialist producers about products and markets, knowledge 
which retailers typically lack. 
A pre-condition to becoming a preferred supplier is producing the private 
label, which is out of the question from the producer's point of view. To the 
producer the benefit would lie in improved forecasting of production planning. 
Foremost, it would mean access to primary market data that can be used to 
develop competencies in category performance and product introductions. 
Exchange of information is in this case not in doubt, it is vital for a 
project that both are agreed upon. Both stand to benefit from it, yet the retailer 
has most information to offer. 
Asset specificity Naturally the producer is stuck in the dairy market, but has 
developed a strong brand. His piece of the market provides quality products 
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with an attractive margin. Beyond that he has a large operation in marketing 
and in research and development, which is as he himself put it 'our obligation 
as a market leader'. The share of this retailer in its turnover is quite small. 
The retailer has outsourced his physical distribution, therefore no assets 
are locked in that field. All deliveries should be made to the distribution 
centre, thus keeping control of his own distribution system. 
One of the consequences of cooperation is the development of exit 
barriers because of the ties between partners. One executive from the retail end 
stated: 'with ties like this becoming more widespread, it's easier to loosen 
them again'. Illustrating his keenness on maintaining his flexibility. 
The lack of bonds on the side of the retailer leads to low switching costs 
and allows him to maintain flexibility. The producer tries to bind retailers by 
presenting himself as a valuable partner, even though dependence in terms of 
turnover is low. 
Moderators 
Power The retailer is able to switch suppliers at will, which clearly shifts the 
balance of power. As one executive recognises, 'It's hard to find cases where 
the retailers don't have a leading role, apart from production and product 
development.'. Their control over resources is maintained through distribution 
to the stores. As a result of this foreign competitors have been allowed on the 
market through the policy of deliveries from the central distribution centre. 
As they are in charge of the ordering system, they also maintain full 
control over information. Now this is to be shared by means of ECR, they 
have every intention of selling it at a high price. 
The control over resources exerted by the producer comes down to 
offering high margins and attractive products. This has proved to be a 
workable strategy. The producer's knowledge of the market has lead to 
continuous product innovations, few of which have failed after introduction. 
This too makes him an attractive partner. 
Therefore the balance of power between retailer and producer, would 
initially not favour any kind of cooperation. If cooperation were to start at all, 
partners should be selected that are somehow able to tip the balance. 
Transaction costs As both partners knew each other well from previous 
business experience the costs in the pre-contractual phase seem very low. 
These are costs for searching for and selecting partners. To be more precise, at 
this point in time the contract for cooperation has not yet been signed. 
Negotiations to shape the contract are the next step and both are assessing the 
costs and benefits involved before reaching a decision. These costs can be 
assumed to be equally distributed. 
The post-contractual part of the picture shows the building of 
commitment, regular contacts between the two and resolving eventual disputes. 
On the side of the retailer, the full infrastructure to do this is already in place. 
However, to the producer, this goes beyond just delivering on time. This 
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involves regular customer contacts and exchange of information. Consequently 
it puts more emphasis on account management on the part of the producer than 
is common at present. Therefore to be able to cooperate, the producer should 
further develop these organizational competencies. The costs associated with 
the transactions, required on entering a partnership like this put an extra 
burden on the producer. 
Vertical coordination 
The case study has taken a closer look at the development of a partnership. An 
incentive is provided by the perishable nature of the product, making the stages 
within the value chain mutually dependent. Common ground can also be found 
in corresponding goals, both aim at comparable ends of the market. Yet, in the 
project the producer proves to be more ambitious. The two also agreed on the 
necessity to exchange information if cooperation based on ECR is to succeed. 
These factors combined will have an initial positive impact on the development 
of vertical cooperation. 
However, the retailer has more than a few trump cards up his sleeve. 
Alternative sources of produce are readily available, he controls the 
distribution system and has a good grip on the information that is needed. 
Additionally, he faces low start costs and potentially high benefits combined 
with a balance of power which is severely distorted in his favour. Thus while 
dependent, he is in a position to set conditions for any kind of vertical 
cooperation. The retailer can maintain his cherished flexibility, and secure an 
independent position. 
On the other side, the producer offers a line of products that is highly 
valued by most retailers. This combined with high grade service and advice to 
his customers should be the ties that lead to a long term relationship. 
However, he faces concentration among retailers that occupy an increasingly 
powerful position. Apart from that, he needs to invest in new organisational 
capabilities. 
Conclusions 
The model presented in this paper provides a framework to analyze vertical 
dependencies among firms. The dependence has been shown to be a function 
of several variables and explains vertical coordination. Product characteristics, 
power balance and costs of the transaction have been identified as important 
moderators in this process. Vertical coordination should be seen as a 
mechanism to perform transactions between firms. 
However, as the model has now been put to its first test, some additional 
comments should be added. Goal congruence has shown to be important in 
developing vertical coordination. As when a certain vagueness is involved, 
such as building a competitive advantage or having correspondence mission 
statements, it is hard to find a basis for cooperation. Resulting from subjective 
views, recognising goal congruence should then be followed by some kind of 
personal commitment. 
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Also the model has shown that variables may share some 
interdependence. Information can be seen as one of the sources of power held 
by the retailer, even though the need for information may spur vertical 
coordination. Equally, the market structure may be a factor underlying a 
position of power, as a share of resources could also mean control over 
resources. Closer attention should be paid to the exact definition of the 
variables and their relations. 
On the side of transaction costs, perhaps a distinction should be made 
between the costs associated with the transaction and the costs and benefits of 
the operations. In the case operational costs and benefits, these can mostly be 
found in distribution. However the definition of transaction costs does not 
allow the inclusion of distribution. 
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